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Preface 
This National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Contractor Report summarizes and 
documents the work performed to develop concepts of use (ConUse), System Requirements and 
Architecture for the proposed L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) terrestrial en route communications system.  
This work was completed under a NASA project-level agreement (PLA FY09_G1M.02-02v1) for 
“New ATM Requirements—Future Communications” in support of a Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA)/European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) Cooperative 
Research Agreement (Action Plan 17 (AP–17)), commonly referred to as the Future Communications 
Study. The work was performed with the guidance of the FAA and NASA. 
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Executive Summary 
A safety hazard analysis was completed providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed 
C-band communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions 
document (Ref. 1).  
Safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards 
with a medium risk were documented.  
This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis. Section 3.6 details recommended 
triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis should be performed as a follow-on 
activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized 
and system rollout timing is determined. 
A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. Although safety 
analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis 
focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; from 
a safety perspective, the security threats may present safety risks.  
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
During the past 4 years, NASA Glenn Research Center and ITT have conducted a three-phase 
technology assessment for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under the joint FAA–European 
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) Cooperative Research Action Plan 
(AP–17), also known as the Future Communications Study (FCS). NASA/ITT provided a system 
engineering evaluation of candidate technologies for the future communications infrastructure (FCI) to be 
used in air traffic management (ATM). Specific recommendations for data communications technologies 
in very high frequency (VHF), C-, L-, and satellite bands, and a set of follow-on research and 
implementation actions have been endorsed by the FAA, EUROCONTROL, and the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO). In the United States, the recommendations from AP–17 are reflected in 
the Joint Planning and Development Office’s (JPDO) “Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen) Integrated Work Plan” (Ref. X) and are represented in the “National Airspace System (NAS) 
Enterprise Architecture Communications and Avionics Roadmaps” (Ref X).  
Action Plan 30 (AP–30), a follow-on cooperative research action plan to AP–17, is expected to start 
in fiscal year 2010 (FY10) to ensure coordinated development of FCI to help enable the advanced ATM 
concepts of operation (ConOps) envisioned for both NextGen in the United States and for 
EUROCONTROL’s Single European Systems ATM Research (SESAR) program in Europe. Follow-on 
research and technology development recommended by NASA Glenn and endorsed by the FAA was 
included in the FAA’s NextGen Implementation Plan 2009. The plan was officially released at 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/nextgen/ on January 30, 2009. The implementation plan includes a 
FY09 solution set work plan for C-band and L-band future communications research under the section, 
“New Air Traffic Management (ATM) Requirements.” 
On February 27, 2009, the FAA approved a project-level agreement (PLA) (PLA FY09_G1M.02-
02v1) for “New ATM Requirements—Future Communications,” to perform the FY09 portion of the 
FAA’s solution-set work plan; this includes development of concepts of use (ConUse), requirements, and 
architecture for both a new C-band airport surface wireless communications system and a new L-band 
terrestrial en route communications system.  
As required under the PLA, this report presents the initial high-level safety risk assessment for 
C-band communications systems. The assessment draws on the functional system analysis conducted in 
parallel and documented in the C-band airport surface communications system standards development 
deliverable.  
The future airport surface communications network is based on the IEEE 802.16e standard and is 
envisioned to support future mobile and fixed data communication applications and services for both 
ground-to-air (G/A) and ground-to-ground (G/G) communication services on the airport surface. 
Examples include information exchanges to support collaborative decision making (CDM), surveillance 
broadcast system (SBS) applications, and System Wide Information Management (SWIM) data 
exchanges and its extension to aircraft (SWIM-Air), which includes aeronautical and metrological data 
link services. A mobile local area network (LAN) on the airport surface may also include fixed elements. 
A number of nonaircraft mobile systems on the aircraft movement area (e.g., service and emergency 
vehicles use, and snow plow operations) could also use the C-band system to exchange information 
between and among aircraft, vehicles, and ground control operators. 
Other future communications applications may include unmanned aircraft system (UAS) data 
communications. 
Safety hazards identification, analysis, and assessment are performed assuming the services identified 
as potential applications for the C-band (5091 to 5150 MHz) system (Ref. 2). Recommendations for 
safety risk mitigation techniques follow the analysis.  
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Safety hazards analyses rely on FAA guidance documents, such as the NAS System Engineering 
Manual, the Safety Management System Manual (SMS), and the System Safety Handbook (SSH) for 
methodology and process.  
1.2 Document Overview 
This document is organized as follows: 
• Section 1.0 includes background system development information as well as document 
organization and references.  
• Section 2.0 describes the scope of the document. 
• Section 3.0 describes methodology and presents the results of safety risk analysis.  
• Appendix A provides an acronyms and abbreviations list. 
• Appendix B presents hierarchical diagrams of functional requirements for the proposed C-band 
communications system.  
• Appendix C contains C-band communications system safety hazards analysis worksheets 
showing the supporting work detail. 
• Appendix D presents a summary of the operational safety assessment for the ATS services 
identified for C-band application adopted from the analysis presented in the COCR. 
• Appendix E lists the existing NAS communications system safety controls.  
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2.0 Scope 
2.1 Risk Management Objective 
The goal of risk management is to ensure that new system development and integration meet or 
exceed FAA safety standards that support the FAA’s core mission of ensuring the safety of the flying 
public. The objective of this document is to identify risks in the proposed C-band communication system 
from a safety viewpoint. 
Figure 1 shows how risk management fits into the overall FAA NAS systems engineering process.  
 
 
Figure 1.—Risk in system engineering (from Ref. 3). 
 
Although risk management is depicted as a separate system engineering task, as with most processes, 
it is closely intertwined with the other key elements. For example, as shown further in this report, 
functional requirements resulting from the functional analysis process become the basis for the safety 
hazard and security threat analyses. Furthermore, the safety engineering (a discipline within specialty 
engineering) and risk management processes are both applied to perform a safety assessment for the 
system (Ref. 3). 
Within the opportunity-risk paradigm, the fundamental objective of the risk management process is to 
identify and analyze uncertainties of achieving program or organizational objectives and develop plans to 
reduce the likelihood and/or consequences of those uncertainties. 
This process is applied to ensure that a program or organization meets technical, schedule, and cost 
commitments, delivers a product or service that satisfies all stakeholders’ lifecycle needs, and provides 
the expected benefit. Four lower-level objectives are established as part of the overall objective: 
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• Timely identification of risks (identifying a potential problem with sufficient lead time so that the 
team may implement appropriate alternate plans) 
• Consistent assessment of the level of risk across a program (providing a structured decision 
making framework for prioritizing resource application) 
• Communication of risk mitigation actions across the program or organization (ensuring that all 
elements of the program or organization are aligned in resolving risks)  
• Review of risk mitigation action performance 
 
Positive impacts on a plan or favorable consequences are not considered in this document in 
accordance with the FAA risk identification and analysis process guidance that treats them as 
opportunities (Ref. 3). Rather “in the context of the SMS, safety is defined as freedom from unacceptable 
risk” (Ref. 4). 
2.2 Types of Identified Risks  
Various types of risks may be identified during the course of system development. As illustrated by 
Figure 2, high-level risks can be categorized as technical, schedule, or business and cost-related risks. 
 
 
Figure 2.—Types of potential risks. 
 
As explained in the NAS System Engineering Manual (SEM) (Ref. 3): 
 
Many sources must be considered for each risk area. For technical risk, likely sources 
include technology maturity, complexity, dependency, stakeholder uncertainty, 
requirements uncertainty, and testing/verification failure. Sources of schedule risks may 
include incomplete identification of tasks, time-based schedule (as opposed to event-
based schedule), critical-path scheduling anomalies, competitive optimism, unrealistic 
requirements, and material availability shortfalls. Cost risks may stem from an uncertain 
number of production units, supplier optimism, additional complexity, change in 
economic conditions, competitive environment, supplier viability, and lack of applicable 
historical data.  
Technical Risks
Schedule 
Risks
Business 
Risks
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Although the three types of risks are interrelated, this document will focus on technical risks only. 
Schedule and business risks are considered out of scope for this task and would significantly depend on 
system acquisition plan and schedule. Factors such as technology advancement and WiMAX profile 
development schedule, business plans, and further service selections could contribute to program risks 
and should be addressed elsewhere. It should also be noted that these nontechnical factors may affect 
technical risks. As such, this document presents an initial safety assessment only, and a safety analysis 
encompassing all three risk types should be revisited at a later stage. 
Only safety risks are addressed for this assessment. Also out of scope for this analysis are the hazards 
attributable to a controller, pilot, or automation, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
hazards, and all hazards not directly related to fixed-to-mobile and fixed-to-fixed communications, such 
as navigation systems and surveillance systems. Security risks are addressed in a separate document being 
prepared by NASA. 
Finalizing the C-band data link profile will determine if any commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
products are used. The risk assessment should be revisited and hazards associated with the use of COTS 
should be evaluated at that time as appropriate. COTS-based risks identified in the SEM (Ref. 3) should 
be used as a starting point for that assessment. 
2.3 System Safety Engineering  
A type of specialty engineering (SE)—system safety engineering (SSE)—is applied to conduct the 
analysis described by this document.  
It should be noted that another SE discipline, electromagnetic environmental effects (E3), is related to 
safety risk assessment but is better addressed with other interference issues. The risks of interference 
problems should be detailed and investigated, and should involve (Ref. 3) 
…system analysis for susceptibility and/or vulnerability to electromagnetic fields or 
capability to generate such fields that might interfere with other systems, identify sources 
of interference, and implement methods for correction within the levels prescribed by 
law, program requirements, spectrum management, or recognized standards. E3 consists 
of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC).  
The results [should then be] used to derive, validate, and verify requirements; evaluate 
system design progress and technical soundness; and manage risk. 
SE analyses performed under this task are intended to aid in identifying and assessing potential 
operational problems early in the process and help shape system requirements. The results are fed into the 
risk management process for risk mitigation and control.  
Safety and security risk identification, assessment, and mitigation for the C-band system are being 
addressed separately. A security risk assessment is performed by NASA as a parallel activity. The safety 
analysis is concerned with prevention of accidental errors and failures; the security threat analysis focuses 
on deliberate attacks. At the same time, both processes identify the events that affect operation of the 
system and are interrelated. Also, “From a safety perspective, the threats that concern security are another 
potential cause of safety hazards, while from a security perspective; the hazards that concern safety are 
another potential outcome of security threats” (Ref. 5). The relationship between the outcomes of the two 
analyses should be addressed when both are complete. 
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3.0 Safety Risks Management 
3.1 Safety Analysis Requirement 
The need for a safety analysis is driven by the FAA categorization of changes requiring safety 
analysis. 
Table 1 depicts system changes recognized as those that need to be evaluated for safety risk (Ref. 4) 
and identifies the changes applicable to the proposed introduction of a C-band system. 
 
 
TABLE 1.—CHANGES REQUIRING SAFETY ANALYSIS 
Categories of change Changes applicable to C-band 
system? 
Airspace changes that impact safety Reorganization of air traffic route structure No 
Resectorization of an airspace No 
Changes to air traffic procedures and 
standards that impact safety 
Reduced separation minima applied to 
airspace 
No 
New operating procedures, including 
departure, arrival, and approach procedures 
Yes 
Waivers to existing procedures, 
requirements, or standards 
No 
Changes to airport procedures and 
standards that impact safety 
Reduced separation minima applied at an 
airport 
No 
Physical changes to airport runways, 
taxiways, or the airport operations area 
Yes 
Changes to equipment that impact safety Introduction of new equipment, systems 
(hardware and software) that impact safety, 
human-to-system interfaces, or facilities used 
in providing air traffic control (ATC) and 
navigation services 
Yes 
Modifications to systems (hardware and 
software), maintenance activities associated 
with those systems, human-to-system 
interfaces, or facilities used in providing 
ATC and navigation services 
 
3.2 Process 
The analyses described in this document adhere to the SSE methodology and involve “evaluation and 
management of the safety risk associated with a system using measures of safety risk identified in various 
hazard analyses, fault tree analyses, and safety risk assessments and in hazard tracking and control 
(Ref. 3). It is anticipated that the approach adopted in this task will allow incorporation of suitable safety 
features in the system design with minimal cost and schedule impact. 
Figure 3 shows the inputs to the safety risk management (SRM) process performed for this task, 
noting the documents used for guidance. 
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Figure 3.—Safety risks management, inputs to the process. (Acronyms defined in Appendix A.) 
 
As depicted on Figure 4, the systematic SRM process applied for this task proceeded through five 
general phases (Ref. 4). 
 
 
Figure 4.—Safety risk management process. 
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Using the NAS SEM for guidance, the decision flow chart detailing how the process was 
implemented is shown in Figure 5. The following sections of this report describe the results of the 
activities conducted to implement this process. 
 
Figure 5.—Safety risk management decision flow chart (Ref. 4). 
3.3 System Description 
Accurate system description is the first step in a safety hazards analysis. As noted in the C-band 
airport surface communications system standards development document (Ref. 6) that details ConUse for 
the proposed system, an AeroMACS,1
Figure 6
 the system covered by this document, will provide air-to-ground 
(A/G) and ground-to-ground (G/G) communications services on the airport surface. 
 depicts an end-to-end communications system supporting air traffic services (ATS). On the 
ground, these systems typically consist of radio ground station subsystems, including radios, antennas, 
cabling, power systems, environmental systems, towers, and monitoring and control (M&C) functionality, 
to provide A/G communications services; networking subsystems to provide G/G communications service 
connectivity to endsystems and endusers; and usually some centralized M&C functionality to monitor and 
control system operations and performance. 
 
                                                     
1AeroMACS is a proposed term for the C-band airport surface communication technology based on the IEEE 
802.16e standard. 
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Figure 6.—Communications systems covered by this document (slightly altered Figure 1-1 from Ref. 7). 
 
A number of nonaircraft mobile systems for use on the aircraft movement area (e.g., service and 
emergency vehicles or snow plow operations) could also use the C-band system to exchange information 
between and among aircraft, vehicles, and ground control operators. 
Finally, and perhaps as an early implementation, a new C-band airport surface mobile LAN is 
expected to be used for fixed point-to-point applications on the airport surface. 
It should be noted that although Figure 6 effectively illustrates different types of communications 
provided by the proposed C-band system (G/G and A/G), it depicts air traffic service provider (ATSP) 
systems only.2  
The C-band communication system safety hazard analysis is based on a C-band system functional 
analysis. This analysis is detailed in the C-band airport surface communications system standards 
development document (Ref. 6). Appendix B of this report contains hierarchical diagrams of the functional 
requirements for the proposed C-band system. The functional breakdown and methodology are adopted 
from the NAS Communication System Safety Hazard Analysis and Security Threat Analysis (Ref. 5) and 
modified as appropriate to reflect the scope and requirements for the proposed C-band system. 
At a high level, the following communication system functions were identified:  
• Use the communication system to send and/or receive messages 
– transceive fixed-to-mobile message 
– transceive mobile-to-fixed message 
– transceive fixed-to-fixed message 
• Provide the C-band communication system, including 
– monitor the C-band communication system 
– maintain the C-band communication system 
– configure the C-band communication system  
                                                     
2ATSP presents a subset of a broader Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP) category that in addition to ATSP 
may encompass Aeronautical Information Services (AIS) providers, communication, navigation, and surveillance 
CNS providers, meteorological office services (METS) providers, and include Airport/Aerodrome Flight 
Information Service (AFIS) providers. 
Aircraft System ElementOperator System
Air Traffic Service Provider (ATSP) System
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Though the proposed C-band could enable ATS, aeronautical (airline) operational control (AOC), and 
aeronautical administrative communication (AAC), ATS are likely to have the strictest safety and security 
requirements. As such, this document considers ATS to be the worst case scenario from the safety 
viewpoint.  
3.4 Safety Risk Identification 
Figure 7 shows the risk management risk identification process recommended by the FAA.  
 
 
Figure 7.—Federal Aviation Administration risk management risk identification flow chart (Ref. 6). 
 
Although multiple factors contribute to the overall program and system risks, the scope of this 
document is limited to safety issues. Security risks are addressed in a separate document. 
To identify potential safety hazards for the proposed C-band system, the hazards present in the 
current NAS Communications System were reviewed first. The safety hazards identified in the NAS 
Safety Hazard Analysis (Ref. 5) were found to be applicable to the proposed C-band system, and Table 2 
shoes the safety hazard categories. Table 2 is decomposed into lower level hazards. 
 
  
•Operability  
•Productivity 
•Supportability 
•Human 
•Security 
•Safety  
•Performance 
•Acquisition 
Requirements
Cost TechnicalSchedule
Requirements
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TABLE 2.—SAFETY HAZARDS CATEGORIES 
Safety hazards categories Safety hazards 
Hazards due to lack of availability of the C-band 
communication system 
C-band communication capability totally unavailable: C-band air 
traffic services (ATS) failure 
C-band communication capability partially unavailable: C-band 
ATS failure 
C-band system communication capability unavailable: Sender to 
recipient of C-band ATS unavailable  
Hazards due to failures of the C-band communication 
system 
C-band communication fails (e.g., aborts) with a given recipient 
for a single message.
C-band communication fails (e.g., aborts) with multiple recipients 
for a single message per aircraft.
Hazards due to misdelivery of a message by the C-band 
communication system 
The recipient accepts a message affecting separation from an 
C-band ATS that is not its control authority.  
The recipient accepts a message NOT affecting separation from a 
C-band ATS that is its control authority.  
A message affecting separation gets to unintended recipient. 
A message NOT affecting separation gets to unintended recipient 
Hazards due to late delivery of a message by the C-band 
communication system 
Message affecting separation received too late (or expired) 
Message NOT affecting separation received too late (or expired) 
Hazards due to corruption of message by the C-band 
communication system 
A message affecting separation corrupted  
A message NOT affecting separation corrupted  
Hazards due to messages arriving out-of-sequence due 
to the C-band communication system 
A message affecting separation sent/received out of sequence 
A message NOT affecting separation sent/received out of sequence 
 
These 15 hazard categories were then applied to each of the high-level C-band communication 
system functions shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8.—Functional hazard categories. (Acronyms are defined in Appendix A.) 
 
Following the methodology suggested in Reference 5, fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-fixed messages 
transmission functions were combined into one category for safety hazards analysis. Fixed-to-fixed 
transmissions hazards are shown in the second hazard category. 
  
•(1) ATS to On-Ground Aircraft Message
• (2) ATS to On-Ground non-Aircraft 
Mobile Message
Transceive Fixed to 
Mobile Message
• (3) On-ground Aircraft to ATS Message
• (4) On-Ground non-Aircraft Mobile to 
ATS Message
Transceive Mobile to 
Fixed Message
• (5)AeroMACS sites to ATC MessagesTransceive Fixed to 
Fixed Message
Fixed to M
obile 
Category
Fixed to 
Fixed 
Category
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Based on this functional categorization of 15 hazard categories applied to each of the two functional 
categories, 30 C-band communication system safety hazards were identified. Details of the identified 
hazards and the safety causes of each hazard are presented in Appendix C.  
3.5 Safety Risks Analysis and Assesment 
Once again, it is useful to borrow from the NAS SEM (Ref. 3) to define the term risk. 
“A risk has three aspects: (1) the event is in the future, (2) the likelihood/probability that 
an event will occur (a degree of uncertainty), and (3) a negative or unfavorable 
consequence/impact if it occurs” 
Safety risk analysis is the third step in the SRM process. For each of the identified C-band 
communication system safety hazards (summarized in Table 2 and detailed in Appendix C) the following 
process was followed (Ref. 5): 
[T]he severity of consequence (i.e., what is the worst thing that can credibly happen) was 
determined. This was done by determining a system state for each hazard that could lead 
to the worst credible effect occurring and then tracing a scenario(s) that could result 
should the hazard occur.  
The system state leading to the worst credible effect (WCE) is the same for all hazards because of the 
C-band communication system, including 
• Heavy traffic conditions 
• Instrument meteorological conditions (IMCs)  
• Adverse weather conditions 
Causes of identified hazards include 
• Hardware failure 
• Software failure 
• Insufficient capacity 
• Radiofrequency (RF) interference 
3.5.1 Hazard Severity Definition and Safety Likelihood Categories 
Table 3 outlines hazard effects and the standardized classification scheme used to describe the 
severity of safety hazards as presented in the COCR Version 2.0 document (Ref. 8). It, in turn, is based on 
the FAA’s Safety Management System Manual (Ref. 4) severity and likelihood definitions and 
EUROCONTROL’s Safety Regulatory Requirement (ESARR 4) Set 1 Severity Indicators.  
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TABLE 3.—DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD SEVERITY (REF. 8) 
Effect on Hazard class 
5, No safety 
effect (NO) 
4, Minor (MN) 3, Major (MJ) 2, Hazardous (HZ) 1, Catastrophic 
(CS) 
General  Does not significantly 
reduce system safety. 
Required actions are 
within operator’s 
capabilities. Includes 
the ATC and flying 
public items. 
Reduces the capability 
of the system or 
operators to cope with 
adverse operating 
conditions to the 
extent that: 
Reduces the 
capability of the 
system or operators 
to cope with adverse 
operating conditions 
to the extent that: 
Total loss of 
system control 
such that: 
Air traffic 
control (ATC) 
Slight increase in 
ATC workload 
Slight reduction in 
ATC capability or 
significant increase in 
ATC workload. 
Reduction in 
separation as defined 
by low- to moderate- 
severity operational 
error or a significant 
reduction in ATC 
capability. 
Reduction in 
separation as 
defined by a high-
severity operation 
error, or a total loss 
of ATC. 
Collisions with 
other aircraft, 
obstacles, or 
terrain 
Flying public No effect on 
flight crew 
No safety effect 
Inconvenience 
Slight increase in 
workload 
Slight reduction in 
safety margin or 
functional capabilities 
Minor illness or 
damage 
Some physical 
discomfort 
Significant increase in 
flight crew workload 
Significant reduction 
in safety margin or 
functional capabilities 
Major illness, injury, 
or damage 
Physical distress 
Large reduction in 
safety margin or 
functional capability 
Serious or fatal 
injury to a small 
number 
Physical distress or 
excessive workload 
Outcome 
would result 
in: 
Hull loss 
Multiple 
fatalities 
 
Following the methodology described in the NAS Communication System Hazard Analysis and 
Security Threat Analysis (Ref. 5) as well as in the COCR Version 2.0 (Ref. 8), this safety analysis was 
limited to hazards caused by C-band communication system failures; hazards due to the controller, and 
the flight crew outside of the communication link portion of a system and/or service were considered out 
of scope.  
Definitions of safety likelihood categories qualifying and quantifying the degree of tolerance for each 
category are shown in Table 4. The likelihood of occurrence of the WCE for each of the identified 
hazards is presented in the hazard analysis worksheets in Appendix C. 
 
TABLE 4.—SAFETY LIKELIHOOD CATEGORIESa 
Category Qualitativeb,c Quantitatived 
A Frequent Expected to occur frequently for an item  Probability of occurrence per operation/operational hour 
is equal to or greater than 1×10–3 
B Probable Expected to occur several times in the 
life of an item  
Probability of occurrence per operation/operational hour 
is less than 1×10–3, but equal to or greater than 1×10–5 
C Remote Expected to occur sometime in the 
lifecycle of an item 
Probability of occurrence per operation/ operational hour 
is less than 1×10–5 but equal to or greater than 1×10–7 
D Extremely remote Unlikely but possible to occur in an 
item’s lifecycle 
Probability of occurrence per operation/operational hour 
is less than 1×10–7 but equal to or greater than 1×10–9 
E Extremely 
improbable 
So unlikely, it can be assumed that it 
will not occur in an item’s lifecycle 
Probability of occurrence per operation/operational hour 
is less than 1×10–9 
aAdopted from Reference 1. Only part of the table found relevant to this analysis is presented. 
bQualitative definition for individual item/system as defined in SRMGSA is used. The definition excludes ATC service/NAS 
level system (assumes NAS-wide occurrence is an order of magnitude greater than an individual item/system), flight 
procedures, and operational definitions.  
cThese qualitative definitions differ from the definitions used in the existing NAS System Safety Risk Analysis. 
dAssumes operation 24 hr/day each day of the year or approximately 8000 hr/yr for a single item/system. 
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Hazard severity and safety likelihood definitions used in this document are the same and/or similar to 
those used in the NAS Communication System Hazard Analysis and Security Threat Analysis (Ref. 5) for 
the existing system as well as the COCR Version 2.0 (Ref. 8) as applied to individual services (described 
later in this report). They, in turn, are based on the recommendations provided in the Safety Risk 
Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document (Ref. 1).3
3.5.2 C-Band System Safety Risks Matrix 
  
Finally, risk was determined for each C-band communication system hazard using its severity and 
likelihood values. A summary of the risk associated with each of the 30 hazards identified for the C-band 
communication system is shown in Table 5 and detailed in the hazard worksheets in Appendix C.  
Figure 9 and Figure 10 present the findings in the “stop-light” matrix format. 
Safety risk likelihood and severity were determined by mapping the results of the operational safety 
assessments for the ATS documented in COCR to the C-band system safety hazards. A summary of the 
safety assessment for the subset of services applicable to the C-band system is presented in Appendix D. 
It should be noted that for the assessment, when more than one category of services is potentially affected 
by a safety hazard, the most severe hazard assessment is applied.  
The COCR identifies two phases of implementation of operational service capabilities. The first 
phase is based on existing or emerging data communications services and is scheduled to be completed 
around 2020. Initial steps under this phase are currently being implemented, for example, as part of the 
FAA Data Communications Program. During the second phase, data communications is expected to 
become the primary means of A/G communication supporting increased automation in the aircraft and on 
the ground.  
Although the C-band system could to be introduced prior to the start of the second phase of the future 
communications infrastructure implementation, Phase II system requirements and constraints are more 
conservative. As such, only the Phase II COCR data is adopted for the table below. 
Data communications is a primary objective for the proposed system; digital voice may be considered 
in the future set of capabilities.  
 
TABLE 5.—C-BAND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SAFETY RISK SUMMARY 
Safety hazards Safety risk likelihood and 
severitya 
Exist. NAS C-band 
FCSb,c 
 1. Communication capability totally unavailable: ATS failured 3D 3D 
 2. Communication capability partially unavailable: ATS failure 3D 3Ce 
 3.  System communication capability unavailable—Sender to recipient of ATS unavailable  4D 4C 
 4. Communication fails (e.g., aborts) with a given recipient for a single message 4C 4Bf 
 5. Communication fails (e.g., aborts) with multiple recipients for a single message per aircraft 4C 3Cg 
 6.  The recipient accepts a message affecting separation from an ATS system that is not its 
control authority 
2D 2D 
 7. The recipient accepts a message NOT affecting separation from an ATS system that is its 
control authority 
5 5D 
 8. A message affecting separation gets to unintended recipient 2D 2D 
 9. A message NOT affecting separation gets to unintended recipient  5 5D 
10. Message affecting separation received too late (or expired)  2D 2D 
11. Message NOT affecting separation received too late (or expired)  5 5D 
                                                     
3It should be noted that the letters used to categorize likelihood definitions and the numbers suggested for the 
severity of consequences definitions in NAS SEM are used opposite to the ones used herein (i.e., “A” represents a 
nonlikely event while “E“ is for Nearly Certain; “1” stands for  Low Risk” hazards, and  5 is for High). This 
discrepancy does not affect the methodology or the essence of risk analysis.  
NASA/CR—2011-216325 15 
TABLE 5.—C-BAND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SAFETY RISK SUMMARY 
Safety hazards Safety risk likelihood and 
severitya 
Exist. NAS C-band 
FCSb,c 
12. A message affecting separation corrupted  2D 3Dh 
13. A message NOT affecting separation corrupted  5 5D 
14. A message affecting separation sent/received out of sequence  4D 3Dh 
15. A message NOT affecting separation sent/received out of sequence  5 5D 
aSeverity assessment presented in this document is based on a worst case scenario. 
bCommunications with vehicles other than aircraft is considered to present lower safety risks, therefore ATS to aircraft 
communication safety risks are presented as a worst-case scenario. 
cFixed messages will be represented by relay messages, for example, those carrying meteorological and surveillance 
information. Messages may also include other data being relayed for the Air/Ground data communication services. Thus, for 
the worst credible effect (WCE), severity and likelihood ratings would be the same for fixed-fixed categories as they are for 
the fixed-to-mobile transmissions. 
dWhere hazard was split in two cases, the most significant risk is shown. 
eThe system being partially unavailable is considered to be more likely than it being totally unavailable. The severity for the 
partial and total unavailability is assumed the same as a worst case scenario. 
fClassified as “probable” (B) and “minor severity” (4) because of the capability of retransmissions. 
gConsidered less likely but potentially more severe than failure of communication with a given recipient. 
hAssumed to be not as severe as when a message affecting separation received too late or expired because system would 
recognize corruption and request retransmission, assuming that re-transmission comes within latency requirements. If re-
transmission is too late, then hazard no. 10 would apply. 
 
 
Figure 9.—C-band system safety risk matrix air-traffic-services-to-aircraft communication. 
 
Severity
No Safety 
Effect Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Likelihood 5 4 3 2 1
Frequent A
Probable B
1
Remote C
1 2
Extremely 
Remote D
5 3 3
Extremely 
Improbable E 4
*
* Unacceptable with Single Point
and Common Cause Failure
High Risk
Medium Risk
Low Risk
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Figure 10.—Risk acceptance criteria (Ref. 1). 
 
The completed risk assessment shows that none of the hazards associated with the proposed C-band 
communication system were determined to be high risk.  
3.5.3 Safety Risks for Unmanned Aircraft System operations 
Services related to UAS operations are also considered to be candidates for the C-band system 
applications. Data transmission is expected to be used as a primary mode of communication with voice 
communications limited to special advisories and emergencies or for aircraft not equipped for datalink 
exchanges (Ref. 9). Studies considering the implications of operating UASs in nonsegregated airspace are 
underway, and RTCA SC–203 is currently creating the standards for the community. The COCR has not 
assessed the requirements to support command and control links (i.e., telecommand and telemetry) for the 
UAS.  
As UAS requirements mature, the command and control link traffic load could be estimated. As noted 
in COCR (Ref. 8)  
All other communications services with UASs are considered to be the same as those with 
manned aircraft, i.e., UAS operation is transparent for the ATM system. In the future, in some 
parts of the world, the number of these vehicles may represent a large portion of an Air Traffic 
Service Unit’s (ATSU’s) traffic load. When providing ATS to a UAS, this may involve the relay 
of communication and execution instructions to and from a remote pilot; however, operational 
performance requirements between an ATSU and an UAS remain the same as those between an 
ATSU and any manned aircraft. 
At this time,  
The only UAS CC applications for which 5091 to 5150 MHz might be a viable candidate band are 
those requiring short-range, high-bandwidth communication at short ranges—e.g., pilot control of a 
low-autonomy UA during takeoff and landing. During those crucial phases of flight, a short-range 
system using this band might be useful as a backup for a “primary” CC link operating in a less 
encumbered band such as 960 to 1024 MHz.4
  
 
                                                     
4Proposed changes to Annex 16 of 5B/296-E (Ref. 10). 
High risk – Unacceptable risk, proposal cannot be implemented
unless hazards are further mitigated so that risk is reduced to
medium or low level and AOV approves the mitigating controls.
Medium risk – Acceptable risk - minimum acceptable safety
objective; proposal may be implemented, but tracking and
management are required.
Low risk – Target - acceptable without restriction or limitation;
hazards are not required to be actively managed but are
documented.
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Reference 10 further explains that  
At ranges less than 3 km, the power levels necessary for the 5091–5150 MHz link would 
probably be consistent with the need to protect incumbent satellite services and with UA 
power constraints. It is likely that relatively few UA would be taking off or landing at 
any given time within the NAS, thus minimizing the interference threat to satellite 
uplinks. The guard times necessary at such short ranges would be small enough that the 
UAS CC links might be able to employ the 802.16e standard, whose growing acceptance 
for vehicular applications may eventually drive down the unit costs of lightweight 
802.16e devices that would be suitable for UA use. However, it is not yet clear that 
802.16e links will perform well at UA takeoff and landing speeds. Some degradation of 
802.16e’s higher-order modulations might result, adversely affecting link capacities. 
Measurement and/or analysis would be needed to quantify this effect. 
A UAS safety analysis will greatly depend on user applications that may vary from commercial to 
Government, military to civil, etc. As defined by the ITU (Ref. 10) and illustrated in Figure 11, 
commercial applications would provide services that would be sold by contractors in the course of 
carrying out normal business operations, while Governmental applications ensure public safety by 
addressing different emergencies and involve issues of public interest and include scientific matters. 
 
 
Figure 11.—UAS applications (from proposed changes to Annex 16 of 5B/296-E (Ref. 9)). 
 
Example operational scenarios for each type of application are presented in Table 6, demonstrating a wide 
range of possible applications. 
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TABLE 6.—UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM OPERATIONAL SCENARIOSa,b 
Mission 
type 
Scenario description 
 
Movie making, sports games, and popular events like concerts 
 
Cargo planes with reduced manning (one-man cockpit) 
 
Inspections for industries (e.g., oil fields, oil platforms, oil pipelines, power line, or rail line) 
 
Provision of airborne relays for cell phones in the future 
 
Commercial agricultural services like crop dusting 
 
Earth science and geographic missions (e.g., mapping and surveying or aerial photography) 
Biological and environmental missions (e.g., animal monitoring, crop spraying, volcano monitoring, biomass surveys, 
livestock monitoring, or tree fertilization) 
 
Coastline inspection, preventive border surveillance, drug control, anti-terrorism operations, strike events, search-
and-rescue of people in distress. Public-interest missions like remote weather monitoring, avalanche prediction and 
control, hurricane monitoring, forest fires prevention surveillance, insurance claims during disasters, and traffic 
surveillance 
 
Famine relief, medical support, aid delivery, search-and-rescue activities 
aProposed changes to Ref. 10. 
bAdditional scenarios and detail can be found in Ref. 9. 
 
As stated at the International Conference & Exhibition on Unmanned Aircraft Systems that took place 
in Paris, France in June 2009, the RTCA Special Committee 203 (SC–203) and EUROCAE Working 
Group 73 (WG–73) have agreed to collaborate on a pilot project for initial UAS safety assessments.  
3.5.4 Airborne System Wide Information management (SWIM) Suitable Services Safety 
Assessment 
System Wide Information Management (SWIM), an FAA technology program designed to facilitate 
sharing of ATM system information (airport operational status, weather information, flight data, status of 
special use airspace, NAS restrictions), might be implemented via G/G, A/G, and A/A communications 
infrastructure components. Each of these components would enable efficient data exchange between 
authorized users in the respective domain. An AeroMACS could provide means for the G/G and A/G data 
transfer. 
An implementation of the proposed C-band system would facilitate meeting the primary objective of 
the SWIM program, that is, to improve the FAA’s ability to manage the efficient flow of information 
through the NAS. When used to enable SWIM capabilities, a C-band system could be designed to assure 
that its use provides the following desired SWIM features: 
• Reduced costs for NAS users to acquire NAS data and exchange information 
• Increased shared situational awareness among the NAS user community 
• FAA-compliant secure data exchange among the NAS user community 
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Figure 12 shows how airborne SWIM (with the communication links potentially provided over the 
C-band for A/G communications on airport surface, e.g., loading flight plans) fits in the overall FAA A/G 
communications plan and illustrates interactions of SWIM elements with the other NextGen programs, 
such as ADS–B and Data Comm.  
 
 
Figure 12.—Airborne SWIM and other NextGen programs (Ref. 11). 
 
C-band communications links will have a lower safety targets when used to provide SWIM-related 
services compared with the other data communications services. For example, Figure 12 shows a required 
level of C3 (medium risk) for Data Comm and D/E 4/5 9 (low risk) for SWIM. 
3.6 C-Band Communication System Safety Risks Treatment 
The final step in the safety analysis is to treat the risk. Risk treatment includes mitigation, monitoring 
and tracking. Risk monitoring and tracking are sometimes referred to as risk maintenance. 
3.6.1 Risk Mitigation 
Figure 13 illustrates the risk management strategies that were considered (Ref. 3).  
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Figure 13.—Risk strategy options. 
 
Risk avoidance is typically an operational strategy that involves a go or no-go decision. This analysis 
focuses on technical risks only. While operational controls could be applied to mitigate technical risks, for 
example a decision not to have a particular service provided over the C-band, such a measure is likely to 
apply to high risk hazards only. Since none of the hazards were found to be high risk, the risk avoidance 
strategy is not recommended for mitigation of the identified C-band safety risks.  
Similar to the above, risk transfer does not appear applicable to the presented communications system 
analysis. The risk transfer strategy shifts the ownership of risk to another party. Again, such operational 
change could be used to mitigate a technical risk, for example, transfer of aircraft separation 
responsibility in applying visual separation from the air traffic controller to the pilot, it would likely to 
apply to high hazard risks only. Since none of the hazards were found to be high risk, the risk transfer 
strategy is not recommended for mitigation of the C-band safety risks.  
Risk assumption and risk control have been determined to be the strategies most applicable to the 
mitigation of the identified technical risks. Following FAA recommendations (Ref. 3), risk assumption 
should be limited to lower level risks, as it implies assuming a risk, a likelihood of occurrence and its 
consequence (i.e., a safety risk must be reduced to medium or low) before it can be accepted into the 
NAS.  
As noted in Reference 5, multiple existing Controls are present in the NAS system that  
either prevent or reduce the probability of the hazard occurring at all, or should the 
hazard occur, prevent or reduce the likelihood of the worst credible severity effect from 
occurring. Existing controls can be requirements, equipage, procedures, and/or 
environmental conditions. Many of the existing controls are not specific to the NAS 
Communication System itself (e.g., the requirement to protect the airspace of both the 
current and amended clearance is a control of the NAS system as a whole). Existing 
controls were implemented specifically with safety in mind.  
The existing controls identified by the NAS safety analysis are included in Appendix E. Most of the 
existing controls are expected to remain in place at the time of C-band system implementation. Many of 
the controls can also be viewed as requirements (generally identified by “the system shall…”). 
Table 12 is annotated with the existing controls that would not be relevant to the proposed system. 
Additional controls specific to an AeroMACS system will be added as part of system design and 
implementation. The current trend points toward meeting QoS/reliability requirements with the number of 
communications threads needed to satisfy these requirements. Depending on final services selection 
(i.e., essential vs. critical), if requirements cannot be met otherwise, the second link  or backup system 
will be considered. If a system is implemented in segments, as, for example a Data Comm program, a 
Feasible risk strategy options identified 
by the risk management activity: 
Risk avoidance: 
select a 
different 
approach or do 
not participate 
in the 
operation, 
procedure, or 
system 
development
Risk transfer: 
shift the 
ownership of 
the risk to 
another party
Risk 
assumption: 
accept the 
likelihood, 
probability, 
and 
consequences 
associated with 
the risk
Risk control: 
develop 
options and 
alternatives 
and/or take 
actions to 
minimize or 
eliminate the 
risk
NASA/CR—2011-216325 21 
backup system may be added at a later stage if and when critical services requiring higher reliability are 
added. 
An example of system redundancy would include dual-blanket-coverage system design providing 
signal coverage from two base stations for any point within a service area. Each of the base stations 
would then be able to pick up full traffic load should another station is unavailable. Fast hand-off 
capabilities inherent to a WiMAX-type system offer another layer of redundancy allowing a subscriber 
station to hand-off to a different base station if its first choice server is unavailable.  
3.6.2 Safety Risks Maintenance 
Risks are dynamic; their profile would change depending on events, decisions, and actions on the 
project. Therefore, risk monitoring and tracking are integral parts of any risk management process. It is 
especially important for a new state-of-the-art system such as the proposed C-band communications 
system.  
As noted earlier, this report presents an initial safety risk assessment. Safety hazards, their 
consequences, and probability of occurrence need to be reevaluated as the C-band system development 
progresses. Triggers for risks reassessment should include 
ConUse changes or significant modifications.—The safety risks assessment detailed in this 
document was based on the identified concepts of use. User requirements changes, modifications to 
system scope, services addition, and so on, will all affect the safety risks.  
The mobile aircraft applications are the main focus of the proposed C-band system. However, 
because of the complexity and a potentially long time (10 years +) involved in certifying and installing 
any new equipment on aircraft, the near to midterm application for the C-band system may be fixed 
airport surface communication and mobile applications not linked to aircraft. Service selection and 
implementation timing may affect safety analysis and trigger reassessment. 
Modification or deletion of any of the existing controls.—Existing NAS controls were assumed to 
be in place at the time of C-band system implementation. Should they be deleted or modified, safety risks 
should be reassessed.  
Technology development.—As technology is not finalized at the time of this study, the 802.16e 
profile for an airport surface is still being developed and testing is being performed. Safety risks 
identification was limited to high-level, technology-independent risks. Additional risks may be identified 
as technology development and standardization progresses. The risks may involve but not be limited to 
interference to/from incumbent systems, capacity limitations, COTS use, etc.  
Schedule milestones.—Various risks exist in respect to the C-band system development and 
implementation schedule in the United States and Europe. This document is limited to technical risks 
identification. Because of schedule changes and coordination requirements between the United States and 
European partners, schedule issues are intertwined with the technology development risks noted above. 
Schedule milestones should be used as triggers for safety risks reassessment. The milestones would 
include completing test bed installation, system testing and results review, preparation of design 
documents, and finalizing the technology standards.  
Additionally, the maturity and implementation schedule of other components of FCS will affect 
C-band system development. As a more definitive timeline and technology details become available, 
potential interfaces between the proposed C-band system and L-band and VDL-2 Data Comm systems 
will be developed. Safety risks analyses will need to be reviewed, updated, and amended as appropriate. 
Risk tracking will become most relevant at the start of system implementation. 
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Appendix A.—Acronyms and Abbreviations 
The following list identifies acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this document. 
 
A/A air to air 
AAC Aeronautical Administrative Communication 
ADS Automatic Dependent Surveillance  
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast 
AIM Aeronautical Information Management 
AOC Aeronautical (Airline) Operational Control 
AOV  Air Traffic Safety Oversight 
AP–17 Action Plan 17 
ATM air traffic management 
ATS Air Traffic Services 
ATSP Air Traffic Service Provider 
ATSU Air Traffic Service Unit 
CC control and communications 
CNS communication, navigation, surveillance 
COCR Communications Operating Concepts and Requirements 
ConOps Concepts of Operations 
ConUse  Concepts of Use 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DoD Department of Defense 
D-ORIS Data Link Operational Route Information Service 
D-OTIS Data Link Operational Terminal Information Service 
D-RVR Data Link Runway Visual Range  
D-SIG Data Link Surface Information and Guidance 
D-SIGMET Data Link Significant Meteorological Information  
D-TAXI Data Link Taxi Clearance 
ERAM En route Automation Modernization 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FCI Future Communications Infrastructure 
FCS Future Communications Study 
FIS flight information services 
FLIPCY flight plan consistency 
FMS flight management system 
GBT ground base transceiver 
GRC Glenn Research Center 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
NAS National Airspace System 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NNEW NextGen Network Enabled Weather 
NOCC National Operations Control Center  
NOTAM Notice to Airmen  
PLA project-level agreement 
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PPD pilot preferences downlink 
QoS quality of service 
RAC risk analysis code 
RF radiofrequency 
RTCA RTCA, Inc. (founded as Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) 
RVR runway visual range  
SAMS Special Use Airspace Management System 
SBS surveillance and broadcast services 
SE system engineering  
SEM System Engineering Manual 
SESAR Single European Sky ATM Research 
SHA safety hazard analysis 
SOC systems operations control 
SSE system safety engineering  
STARS Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System 
SWIM  System Wide Information Management 
TFM traffic flow management 
UA unmanned aircraft 
UAS unmanned aircraft system 
VHF very high frequency 
WAKE wake vortex 
WCE worst credible effect 
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Appendix B.—Hierarchical Diagrams of Functional Requirements 
Appendix B contains the functional analysis of the C-band communication system presented as a 
series of hierarchical diagrams. The functional analysis was used to structure both the safety and security 
analyses. The “C” preceding all of the numerical functional levels is used to represent C-band.  
The analysis and diagrams are adopted from the National Airspace System (NAS) Communications 
System Safety Hazard Analysis and Security Threat Analysis document (Ref. 5).  
Solid blocks in the diagrams represent system functions that are part of the C-band system scope 
assumptions; white background blocks show NAS functions that are currently not part of the C-band 
functionality.  
 
 
Figure 14.—C-band communications system high level. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.—Decomposition of use C-band communications system (transmit/receive messages). 
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Figure 16.—Decomposition of transceive fixed-to-mobile message. 
 
 
Figure 17.—Decomposition of transceive mobile-to-fixed message. 
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Figure 18.—Decomposition of transceive fixed-to-fixed messages. 
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Figure 19.—Generic decomposition of transceive data message. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20.—Generic decomposition of initiate data message. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21.—Generic decomposition of process data message for sending. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22.—Generic decomposition of send data message. 
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Figure 23.—Generic decomposition of process received data message. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24.—Generic decomposition of deliver data message. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25.—Generic decomposition of provide failure processing. 
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Figure 26.—Decomposition of operate C-band communications system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27.—Decomposition of monitor C-band communications system. 
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Figure 28.—Decomposition of configure C-band communications system. 
  
C. 1.2.3 .1
Determine 
Capacity
C. 1.2.3 
Configure L-Band 
Communications 
System 
C. 1.2.3.2 
Configure 
Communications 
Path
C. 1.2.3.3 
Configure 
Security
C. 1.2.3 4
Configure 
Parameters
These are the 
parameters that are 
not done in 
communications 
path or security
C. 1.2.3 .2.3
Disseminate 
Contact/Resource 
Information
C. 1.2.3.2.2 
Assign Resources
C. 1.2.3 .2.1
Determine 
Available 
Resources
C. 1.2.3 .3.3
Disseminate 
Security 
Information
C. 1.2.3.3.2 
Apply Security 
Resources
C. 1.2.3 .3.1
Determine 
Security Situation
NASA/CR—2011-216325 32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29.—Decomposition of maintain C-band communications system. 
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Appendix C.—Safety Hazard Analysis Worksheets 
C.1 C-Band Communication SHA Table Cross Reference 
For each of the five C-band communication system functions resulted from the functional system 
analysis, a typical list of the types of messages transmitted5 Table 7 is shown in . For some functions, the 
hazard scenarios were considered to be the same; and thus a single hazard worksheet table can be used for 
more than one function. The last column of Table 7 provides a cross reference to the function’s hazard 
worksheet table. 
 
TABLE 7.—SAFETY HAZARD ANALYSIS (SHA) TABLE CROSS REFERENCEa 
 Information type 
(including 
corresponding function 
ID) 
Message examples Hazard table  
cross reference 
1 Transceive ATS to  
Aircraft Message 
C.1.1.1.2.1 
• Contract requesting data 
• Contract acknowledgments 
• OTIS reports, addressed or broadcast communications 
• SIGMET reports, addressed or broadcast 
communications, event basis only 
• Airport data to be displayed on board (D–SIG) 
• RVR information, addressed or broadcast 
communications 
Table 8 
Transceive Aircraft to 
ATS Message 
C.1.1.2.2.1 
• Requests (i.e., demand, periodic, or event contract) for 
reports 
• Contract acknowledgments 
• Current and periodic position (FLIPCY), addressed 
communications 
• Meteorological data (FLIPCY), addressed 
communications 
• Ground speed (FLIPCY), addressed communications 
• Broadcast of WAKE characteristics (e.g., aircraft type, 
weight, and flap and speed settings) 
• Flight limitations (e.g., maximum acceptable flight 
level) (PPD), addressed communications 
• Pilot flight preferences (PPD), addressed 
communications 
• Flight plan modification requests (e.g., desired route or 
speed limitations) (PPD), addressed communications 
Table 8 
2 Transceive ATS to 
Non-Aircraft Message 
C.1.1.1.2.2 
• Contract requesting data 
• Contract acknowledgments 
• Reports, addressed or broadcast communication 
Communication involving an 
aircraft was considered to 
present a higher safety risk 
compared with the 
communication with a non-
aircraft vehicle. As such, only 
hazards associated with aircraft 
communications are included 
as they potentially lead to a 
WCE. 
Transceive Non-
Aircraft 
to ATS Message 
C.1.1.2.2.2 
• Contract requesting data 
• Contract acknowledgments 
• Reports, addressed or broadcast communication 
                                                     
5Message types are based on services definitions presented in Reference 8. 
NASA/CR—2011-216325 34 
TABLE 7.—SAFETY HAZARD ANALYSIS (SHA) TABLE CROSS REFERENCEa 
 Information type 
(including 
corresponding function 
ID) 
Message examples Hazard table  
cross reference 
3 Transceive Fixed to 
Fixed Message 
C.1.1.4.1.1 
• Relaying meteorological data  
• Relaying surveillance data 
• Relaying air/ground communications data 
Fixed messages will be 
represented by relay messages, 
for example, those carrying 
meteorological and surveillance 
information. Messages may 
also include other data being 
relayed for the air/ground data 
communication services. Thus, 
for the WCE, severity and 
likelihood ratings would be the 
same for fixed-fixed categories 
as they are for the fixed-to-
mobile transmissions. 
aAcronyms are defined in Appendix A. 
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C.2 Hazard Analysis Worksheets 
For each of the hazards identified for the C-band communication system, the potential causes of the 
hazard were listed. The system state was also identified. The system state used is the state that fosters the 
worst credible outcome. The Safety Hazard Analysis (SHA) was captured in the tabular format in fixed 
messages (C.1.1.4.1.1 Transceive Fixed-to-Fixed Message Function) will be represented by relay 
messages, for example, those carrying meteorological and surveillance information. Messages may also 
include other data being relayed for the air/ground data communication services. Thus, for the WCE, 
severity and likelihood ratings would be the same for fixed-fixed categories as they are for the fixed-to 
mobile transmissions. 
Possible effects are unrelated to the services currently planned for a C-band system; that is, the WCE 
would generally apply to using the data link for clearances related services that may be provided over a 
C-band system.  
The worksheets are slightly modified worksheets from the tables provided in Reference 5. The 
modifications include but are not limited to different Risk/RAC assessments. The columns shown in each 
of the SHA tables are defined as follows: 
• Column 1—Hazard identification, unique tag used to identify each hazard 
• Column 2—Hazard description, description of the hazard 
• Column 3—Causes, list of potential causes that could result the hazard occurring 
• Column 4—Risk/RAC, using the risk categorization outlined earlier in this report, the column 
provides the worst possible credible effect and the likelihood of that effect should the hazard occur 
• Column 5—Potential effects, provides a scenario leading to the worst credible effect if the hazard 
occurs 
• Column 6—Comments: provides additional rational for the resulting Risk/RAC 
Communication involving an aircraft was considered to present a higher safety risk compared with 
the communication with a nonaircraft vehicle. As such, only hazards associated with aircraft 
communications are included as they potentially lead to a WCE. 
The section presents the 15 identified C-band communication system hazards as they apply to messages 
exchanged between an ATS and an aircraft on the ground. Hazard 1 is split into 2 cases (1a and 1b) to 
distinguish between total and partial loss of ATS ground communication.  
Table 8 contains the hazard analysis worksheet for the following functions: 
• C.1.1.1.2.1 Transceive ATS to On-Ground Aircraft Message 
• C.1.1.2.2.1 Transceive On-Ground Aircraft to ATS Message 
The system state leading to the worst credible effect (WCE) is the same for all ATS-aircraft hazards 
due to the C-band communication system: 
• Heavy traffic conditions 
• Instrument meteorological conditions (IMCs)  
• Adverse weather conditions 
Fixed messages (C.1.1.4.1.1 Transceive Fixed to Fixed Message Function) will be represented by 
relay messages, for example, those carrying meteorological and surveillance information. Messages may 
also include other data being relayed for the A/G data communication services. Thus, for the WCE, 
severity +and likelihood ratings would be the same for fixed-fixed categories as they are for the fixed-to-
mobile transmissions. 
Possible effects are unrelated to the services currently planned for a C-band system; that is, the WCE 
would generally apply to using the data link for clearances related services that may be provided over a 
C-band system. 
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 to
 se
ve
ra
l a
irc
ra
ft.
 
• 
W
he
n 
try
in
g 
to
 tr
an
sm
it 
th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
es
, c
on
tro
lle
r i
s i
nf
or
m
ed
 th
at
 m
es
sa
ge
s c
an
no
t b
e 
tra
ns
m
itt
ed
 to
 a
ll 
re
qu
ire
d 
ai
rc
ra
ft.
 
O
R 
• 
C
on
tro
lle
r k
no
w
s i
n 
ad
va
nc
e 
th
at
 N
A
S 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 is
 u
na
va
ila
bl
e 
to
 so
m
e 
of
 th
e 
ai
rc
ra
ft.
 
• 
C
on
tro
lle
r m
us
t r
ev
er
t t
o 
tra
ns
m
itt
in
g 
cl
ea
ra
nc
es
 v
ia
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
m
ea
ns
 (e
.g
., 
al
te
rn
at
e 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y,
 tr
an
sf
er
rin
g 
to
 a
no
th
er
 se
ct
or
 o
r r
el
ay
). 
• 
Th
is
 c
ou
ld
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 c
on
tro
lle
r w
or
kl
oa
d.
 
• 
Th
is
 c
ou
ld
 a
ls
o 
ca
us
e 
a 
sl
ig
ht
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 a
irc
re
w
 w
or
kl
oa
d.
 
• 
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 a
ir 
tra
ff
ic
 c
ap
ab
ili
ty
. 
O
R 
C
as
e 
2 
• 
A
irc
re
w
 a
tte
m
pt
s t
o 
se
nd
 c
le
ar
an
ce
 re
sp
on
se
. 
• 
B
ot
h 
cu
rr
en
t a
nd
 n
ew
 c
le
ar
an
ce
s a
re
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
. 
• 
W
or
kl
oa
d 
re
m
ai
ns
 w
ith
in
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
w
or
kl
oa
d 
so
 n
o 
ha
za
rd
. 
Th
is
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
lo
ss
 o
f 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 fo
r a
 
se
ct
or
 w
ith
in
 a
 fa
ci
lit
y.
 
A
TS
—
A
irc
ra
ft 
C
om
m
 3
 
C
-b
an
d 
sy
st
em
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
ca
pa
bi
lit
y 
un
av
ai
la
bl
e—
ai
rc
ra
ft 
(s
in
gl
e 
ai
rc
ra
ft)
 
A
irc
re
w
 c
an
no
t 
se
nd
/re
ce
iv
e 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
to
 g
ro
un
d,
 
1.
H
ar
dw
ar
e 
fa
ilu
re
 
2.
 S
of
tw
ar
e 
fa
ilu
re
 
3.
 In
su
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
co
ve
ra
ge
 
4.
 R
F 
in
te
rf
er
en
ce
  
 
4C
 
• 
A
irc
re
w
 n
ee
ds
 to
 re
qu
es
t n
ew
/a
m
en
de
d 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e.
 
• 
W
he
n 
try
in
g 
to
 re
qu
es
t t
he
 n
ew
 c
le
ar
an
ce
, a
irc
re
w
 d
et
er
m
in
es
 th
at
 m
es
sa
ge
 c
an
no
t b
e 
tra
ns
m
itt
ed
. 
O
R 
• 
A
irc
re
w
 k
no
w
s i
n 
ad
va
nc
e 
th
at
 N
A
S 
ai
rc
ra
ft-
gr
ou
nd
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 a
re
 u
na
va
ila
bl
e.
 
• 
A
irc
re
w
 m
us
t u
se
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
m
ea
ns
 o
f c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
(e
.g
., 
re
la
y)
. 
• 
Th
is
 m
ay
 c
au
se
 a
 sl
ig
ht
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 a
irc
re
w
 w
or
kl
oa
d.
 
• 
Th
is
 re
su
lts
 in
 a
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 c
on
tro
lle
r w
or
kl
oa
d 
m
ov
in
g 
ot
he
r a
irc
ra
ft.
 
• 
Sl
ig
ht
 re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 a
ir 
tra
ff
ic
 c
ap
ab
ili
ty
 d
ue
 to
 u
se
 o
f a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
. 
Th
is
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
on
e 
or
 a
ll 
ai
rc
ra
ft,
 b
ut
 c
on
si
de
re
d 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
A
TS
—
A
irc
ra
ft 
C
om
m
 4
 
M
es
sa
ge
 fa
ils
 w
ith
 a
 
gi
ve
n 
ai
rc
ra
ft.
 
1.
 G
ro
un
d 
m
es
sa
ge
 
(o
r p
ar
t) 
do
es
 n
ot
 
m
ak
e 
it 
to
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 
2.
 A
irc
ra
ft 
m
es
sa
ge
 
(o
r p
ar
t) 
do
es
 n
ot
 
m
ak
e 
it 
to
 g
ro
un
d.
 
4B
 
• 
C
on
tro
lle
r i
ss
ue
s a
 n
ew
 c
le
ar
an
ce
. 
• 
C
on
tro
lle
r d
oe
s n
ot
 re
ce
iv
e 
re
sp
on
se
 to
 c
le
ar
an
ce
; e
ith
er
 th
e 
ai
rc
re
w
 d
id
 n
ot
 re
ce
iv
e 
th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e;
 o
r t
he
 a
irc
re
w
 re
ce
iv
ed
 th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e 
an
d 
re
sp
on
se
 is
 lo
st
. 
• 
Th
er
e 
is
 a
n 
am
bi
gu
ity
 o
f w
he
th
er
 th
e 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
is
 e
xe
cu
tin
g 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t o
r n
ew
 c
le
ar
an
ce
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, b
ot
h 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t a
nd
 n
ew
 c
le
ar
an
ce
s a
re
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
. 
• 
Th
is
 re
su
lts
 in
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
co
nt
ro
lle
r w
or
kl
oa
d 
in
 re
so
lv
in
g 
th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
(e
.g
., 
re
tra
ns
m
itt
in
g 
th
e 
m
es
sa
ge
). 
• 
Sl
ig
ht
 lo
ss
 o
f a
ir 
tra
ff
ic
 c
on
tro
l c
ap
ab
ili
ty
 in
 th
e 
af
fe
ct
ed
 a
re
a.
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H
az
ar
d 
no
. 
H
az
ar
d 
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
C
au
se
s 
R
is
k 
an
al
ys
is
 
co
de
 
(R
A
C
) 
Po
ss
ib
le
 e
ff
ec
t 
C
om
m
en
ts
 
A
TS
—
A
irc
ra
ft 
C
om
m
 5
 
M
es
sa
ge
 fa
ils
 w
ith
 
m
ul
tip
le
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 
1.
 G
ro
un
d 
m
es
sa
ge
 
(o
r p
ar
t) 
do
es
 n
ot
 
m
ak
e 
it 
to
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 
2.
 A
irc
ra
ft 
m
es
sa
ge
 
(o
r p
ar
t) 
do
es
 n
ot
 
m
ak
e 
it 
to
 g
ro
un
d.
 
3C
 
• 
C
on
tro
lle
r i
ss
ue
s n
ew
 c
le
ar
an
ce
s t
o 
m
ul
tip
le
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 
• 
C
on
tro
lle
r d
oe
s n
ot
 re
ce
iv
e 
re
sp
on
se
 to
 th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
es
; e
ith
er
 th
e 
ai
rc
re
w
 d
id
 n
ot
 re
ce
iv
e 
th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e;
 o
r t
he
 a
irc
re
w
 re
ce
iv
ed
 th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e 
an
d 
re
sp
on
se
s a
re
 lo
st 
• 
Th
er
e 
is
 a
n 
am
bi
gu
ity
 o
f w
he
th
er
 th
e 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
ar
e 
ex
ec
ut
in
g 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t o
r n
ew
 
cl
ea
ra
nc
es
. H
ow
ev
er
; b
ot
h 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t a
nd
 n
ew
 c
le
ar
an
ce
s a
re
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
. 
• 
Th
is
 re
su
lts
 in
 a
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
co
nt
ro
lle
r w
or
kl
oa
d 
in
 re
so
lv
in
g 
th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
w
ith
 
m
ul
tip
le
 a
irc
ra
ft 
(e
.g
., 
re
tra
ns
m
itt
in
g 
th
e 
m
es
sa
ge
) 
• 
Sl
ig
ht
 re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 a
ir 
tra
ff
ic
 c
ap
ab
ili
ty
 
 
A
TS
—
A
irc
ra
ft 
C
om
m
 6
 
A
n 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
ac
ts
 o
n 
m
es
sa
ge
s a
ff
ec
tin
g 
se
pa
ra
tio
n 
(e
.g
., 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e)
 fr
om
 a
 
gr
ou
nd
 sy
st
em
 th
at
 is
 
no
t i
ts
 c
on
tro
l 
au
th
or
ity
.  
A
n 
un
au
th
or
iz
ed
 
gr
ou
nd
 sy
st
em
 se
nd
s 
a 
m
es
sa
ge
 a
ff
ec
tin
g 
se
pa
ra
tio
n.
 
2D
 
• 
A
irc
re
w
 a
cc
ep
ts
 a
 c
le
ar
an
ce
 fr
om
 a
 g
ro
un
d 
sy
st
em
 n
ot
 in
 c
on
tro
l o
f t
he
 a
irc
ra
ft 
• 
Th
e 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 a
ut
ho
rit
y 
is
 u
na
w
ar
e 
of
 th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e;
 a
nd
 c
on
se
qu
en
tly
 th
e 
ai
rs
pa
ce
 is
 
no
t p
ro
te
ct
ed
 
• 
Th
is
 c
ou
ld
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n.
 
• 
Th
e 
lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
re
su
lt 
in
 la
rg
e 
re
du
ct
io
ns
 in
 sa
fe
ty
 m
ar
gi
ns
 
• 
R
es
ol
vi
ng
 th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
al
so
 re
su
lt 
in
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
A
TC
 w
or
kl
oa
d 
du
e 
to
 
ha
vi
ng
 to
 m
ov
e 
se
ve
ra
l a
irc
ra
ft 
to
 re
-e
st
ab
lis
h 
or
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
se
pa
ra
tio
n.
 
• 
R
es
ol
vi
ng
 th
e 
lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
ca
us
e 
tim
e 
cr
iti
ca
l a
irc
re
w
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 a
nd
 
ex
ce
ss
iv
e 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
w
or
kl
oa
d 
 
A
TS
—
A
irc
ra
ft 
C
om
m
 7
 
A
n 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
ac
ts
 o
n 
m
es
sa
ge
s N
O
T 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
se
pa
ra
tio
n 
fr
om
 a
 g
ro
un
d 
sy
st
em
 
th
at
 is
 n
ot
 it
s c
on
tro
l 
au
th
or
ity
.  
A
n 
un
au
th
or
iz
ed
 
gr
ou
nd
 sy
st
em
 se
nd
s 
a 
m
es
sa
ge
 N
O
T 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
se
pa
ra
tio
n.
 
5D
 
• 
A
irc
re
w
 a
cc
ep
ts
 a
 m
es
sa
ge
 th
at
 d
oe
s n
ot
 a
ff
ec
t s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
fr
om
 a
 g
ro
un
d 
sy
st
em
 n
ot
 in
 
co
nt
ro
l o
f t
he
 a
irc
ra
ft 
• 
Ti
m
e 
m
ay
 b
e 
sp
en
t r
es
po
nd
in
g 
to
 a
 m
es
sa
ge
 th
at
 th
at
 d
oe
s n
ot
 a
pp
ly
 
• 
Th
is
 d
oe
s n
ot
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n.
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H
az
ar
d 
no
. 
H
az
ar
d 
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
C
au
se
s 
R
is
k 
an
al
ys
is
 
co
de
 
(R
A
C
) 
Po
ss
ib
le
 e
ff
ec
t 
C
om
m
en
ts
 
A
TS
—
A
irc
ra
ft 
C
om
m
 8
 
A
 m
es
sa
ge
 a
ff
ec
tin
g 
se
pa
ra
tio
n 
is
 a
ct
ed
 o
n 
by
 a
n 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 
re
ci
pi
en
t. 
 
1.
 A
dd
re
ss
 is
 
co
rr
up
te
d 
2.
 M
is
de
liv
er
ed
 
3.
 S
te
p-
on
 
2D
 
C
as
e 
1 
• 
A
 c
le
ar
an
ce
 is
 tr
an
sm
itt
ed
 a
nd
 re
ac
he
s a
n 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 T
he
 a
irc
re
w
 d
oe
s n
ot
 
re
al
iz
e 
th
at
 th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e 
is
 n
ot
 fo
r t
he
m
 a
nd
 a
cc
ep
ts
 th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e.
  (
W
he
n 
th
e 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 re
ci
pi
en
t i
s n
ot
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
l a
ut
ho
rit
y,
 se
e 
A
TS
-A
irc
ra
ft 
C
O
M
M
-6
.) 
• 
U
po
n 
re
ce
ip
t o
f t
he
 W
IL
C
O
 to
 th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e,
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
lle
r 
 
(a
) d
oe
s n
ot
 re
al
iz
e 
th
at
 th
e 
W
IL
C
O
 is
 fr
om
 a
 d
iff
er
en
t a
irc
ra
ft 
th
an
 th
e 
in
te
nd
ed
 o
ne
 o
r 
(b
) t
he
 c
on
tro
lle
r r
ea
liz
es
 th
at
 th
e 
W
IL
C
O
 is
 fr
om
 a
n 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 
 
(T
he
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
ca
se
 a
 a
nd
 c
as
e 
b;
 is
 ju
st
 h
ow
 so
on
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
lle
r r
ea
liz
es
 th
at
 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 si
tu
at
io
n 
th
at
 n
ee
ds
 re
so
lu
tio
n.
) 
• 
In
 e
ith
er
 c
as
e,
 th
e 
ai
rs
pa
ce
 is
 n
ot
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
 a
nd
 c
ou
ld
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n.
 
• 
Th
e 
lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
re
su
lt 
in
 la
rg
e 
re
du
ct
io
ns
 in
 sa
fe
ty
 m
ar
gi
ns
. 
• 
R
es
ol
vi
ng
 th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
al
so
 re
su
lt 
in
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
A
TC
 w
or
kl
oa
d 
du
e 
to
 h
av
in
g 
to
 
m
ov
e 
se
ve
ra
l a
irc
ra
ft 
to
 re
es
ta
bl
is
h 
or
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
se
pa
ra
tio
ns
. 
• 
R
es
ol
vi
ng
 th
e 
lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
ca
us
e 
tim
e-
cr
iti
ca
l a
irc
re
w
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 a
nd
 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
w
or
kl
oa
d.
 
C
as
e 
2 
• 
Th
e 
re
sp
on
se
 to
 a
 c
le
ar
an
ce
 is
 se
nt
 a
nd
 re
ac
he
s a
n 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 g
ro
un
d 
sy
st
em
. 
• 
Th
e 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 g
ro
un
d 
sy
st
em
 re
ce
iv
es
 a
 m
es
sa
ge
 th
at
 is
 u
ne
xp
ec
te
d,
 b
ut
 is
 n
o 
m
or
e 
th
an
 a
 n
ui
sa
nc
e.
 
• 
Th
e 
gr
ou
nd
 sy
st
em
 th
at
 sh
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
re
ce
iv
ed
 th
e 
re
sp
on
se
 m
es
sa
ge
 d
oe
s n
ot
 re
ce
iv
e 
an
y 
m
es
sa
ge
, a
nd
 th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e 
m
es
sa
ge
 e
xp
ire
s. 
 
 
A
TS
—
A
irc
ra
ft 
C
om
m
 9
 
A
 m
es
sa
ge
 N
O
T 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
se
pa
ra
tio
n 
is
 
ac
te
d 
on
 b
y 
an
 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 re
ci
pi
en
t. 
1.
 A
dd
re
ss
 is
 
co
rr
up
te
d 
2.
 M
is
de
liv
er
ed
 
3.
 S
te
p-
on
 
5D
 
C
as
e 
1 
• 
A
 m
es
sa
ge
 N
O
T 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
se
pa
ra
tio
n 
re
ac
he
s a
n 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 T
he
 a
irc
re
w
 d
oe
s 
no
t r
ea
liz
e 
th
at
 th
e 
m
es
sa
ge
 is
 n
ot
 fo
r t
he
m
 a
nd
 a
ct
s o
n 
it.
 
• 
If
 th
e 
m
es
sa
ge
 re
qu
ire
s a
 re
sp
on
se
, u
po
n 
re
ce
ip
t o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
se
, t
he
 c
on
tro
lle
r  
 
(a
) d
oe
s n
ot
 re
al
iz
e 
th
at
 th
e 
re
sp
on
se
 is
 fr
om
 a
 d
iff
er
en
t a
irc
ra
ft 
th
an
 th
e 
in
te
nd
ed
 o
ne
 o
r 
(b
) t
he
 c
on
tro
lle
r r
ea
liz
es
 th
at
 th
e 
re
sp
on
se
 is
 fr
om
 a
n 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 
• 
If
 th
e 
m
es
sa
ge
 d
oe
s n
ot
 re
qu
ire
 a
 re
sp
on
se
, t
he
 c
on
tro
lle
r m
ay
 n
ot
 b
e 
aw
ar
e 
th
at
 
m
es
sa
ge
 w
en
t t
o 
an
 u
ni
nt
en
de
d 
re
ci
pi
en
t, 
un
le
ss
 fl
ig
ht
 c
re
w
 e
xp
ec
tin
g 
a 
m
es
sa
ge
, 
qu
er
ie
s f
or
 m
is
si
ng
 m
es
sa
ge
. 
• 
Th
is
 d
oe
s n
ot
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n.
 
• 
A
t m
os
t t
hi
s c
ou
ld
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 sl
ig
ht
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 A
TC
 w
or
kl
oa
d 
du
e 
to
 e
ith
er
 re
se
nd
in
g 
m
es
sa
ge
 to
 th
e i
nt
en
de
d 
ai
rc
ra
ft.
 In
 g
en
er
al
 th
is 
w
ou
ld
 b
e w
el
l w
ith
in
 th
e n
or
m
al
 w
or
kl
oa
d.
  
• 
Th
er
e 
m
ay
 b
e 
a 
sl
ig
ht
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 a
irc
re
w
 w
or
kl
oa
d 
(o
f t
he
 u
ni
nt
en
de
d 
ai
rc
ra
ft)
 in
 
re
sp
on
di
ng
 to
 a
 m
es
sa
ge
 n
ot
 a
pp
lic
ab
le
 to
 th
em
. I
n 
ge
ne
ra
l t
hi
s w
ou
ld
 b
e 
w
el
l w
ith
in
 th
e 
no
rm
al
 w
or
kl
oa
d.
 
C
as
e 
2 
• 
A
 re
qu
es
t m
es
sa
ge
 re
ac
he
s a
n 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 g
ro
un
d 
sy
st
em
. 
• 
Th
e c
on
tro
lle
r d
oe
s n
ot
 re
al
iz
e t
ha
t r
eq
ue
st 
is 
no
t f
or
 th
em
 an
d 
re
sp
on
ds
 w
ith
 a 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e. 
• 
Th
is
 g
ro
un
d 
sy
st
em
 is
 n
ot
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
l a
ut
ho
rit
y 
of
 th
e 
ai
rc
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Appendix D.—Summary of the Operational Safety Assessment for the 
ATS Services Identified for C-Band Application 
 
Communications Operating Concepts and Requirements (COCR) Version 2.0 documents operational 
and safety requirements for air traffic services (ATS) data communications services and information 
security requirements for ATS and autonomous operations services (AOS). A service-level operational 
safety assessment (OSA) is performed to derive safety requirements (Ref. 8). 
The following subsections summarize the assessment for the services applicable to the proposed 
C-band communications system as proposed by the Future Communications Infrastructure (FCI) 
Aeronautical Data Services Definition Task Report (Ref. 2). 
D.1 Safety Objectives Definitions 
Table 8 outlines the hazard effects and the classification scheme used to describe the severity of the 
ATS service hazards.  
Based on the fact that each class hazard can be tolerated to a different degree, COCR derives safety 
objectives quantifying the degree of tolerance for each hazard class as shown in Table 9. 
 
TABLE 9.—SAFETY OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (REF. 8) 
Hazard class Safety objective Definition, 
per flight hour 
5, no safety effect Frequent ≥1 occurrence in 10–3 
4, minor Probable ≤1 occurrence in 10–3 
3, major Remote ≤1 occurrence in 10–5 
2, hazardous Extremely remote ≤1 occurrence in 10–7 
1, catastrophic Extremely improbable ≤1 occurrence in 10–9 
D.2 Service-Level Safety Assessment (C-Band Services Only) 
The COCR provides a useful operational safety assessment summary applicable to the C-band ATS 
services case (Ref. 8): 
At the highest level the ATS services operational safety hazards are (1) loss of service, 
and (2) hazardously misleading information. Loss of service is defined the lack of 
availability of a service when it is required. Hazardously misleading information consists 
of undetected corrupted messages, undetected mis-delivered messages, undetected late or 
missing messages and undetected out-of-sequence messages. The safety analyses were 
based on the operational use of the services as described in Sections 2 and 3[of the 
COCR], in conjunction with the operational environment characteristics and conditions 
described in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.4.1 [of the COCR].  
Note that only services identified as potential applications for the proposed C-band system (Ref. FCI 
Aeronautical Data Services Definition Task Report) are included in this document, thus presenting only a 
subset of the corresponding section and tables of the COCR. 
Table 10 presents the OSA hazard severity and corresponding safety objectives for service categories 
for the two high-level safety hazards. As discussed earlier, introduction of a C-band system is assumed 
to correspond to Phase II future radio system (FRS) evolution.  
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TABLE 10.—AIR TRAFFIC SAFETY OPERATIONAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT HAZARD 
 SEVERITY AND SAFETY OBJECTIVES 
Service category Loss of service Hazardously misleading  
information 
Severity Safety objective Severity Safety objective 
Flight information services (FIS) 4 Probable 2 Extremely remote 
Flight position/intent/preferences service (FPS) 3 Remote 2 Extremely remote  
 
Figure 30 and Figure 31 present safety risk matrices for loss of service and hazardously misleading 
information hazards, respectively.  
 
 
 
Figure 30.—Safety risk matrix, loss of service. 
 
Severity
No Safety 
Effect Low Medium High-Severe
High-
Catastrophic
Likelihood 5 4 3 2 1
Frequent A
Probable B
1
Remote C
1
Extremely 
Remote D
Extremely 
Improbable E 4
*
* Unacceptable with Single Point
and Common Cause Failure
High Risk
Medium Risk
Low Risk
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Figure 31.—Safety risk matrix, hazardously misleading information. 
 
As described in the COCR (Ref. 8), Table 11 provides safety assessment for each ATS service. The 
column headers are defined as follows: 
• Service.—The acronym for the ATS service. 
• Integrity.—The safety effect when an undetected error occurs. 
• Continuity.—The safety effect when communications fails once started. 
• Availability of Provision.—The safety effect when unable to communicate to all aircraft. 
• Availability of Use.—The safety effect when unable to communicate with one aircraft. 
 
TABLE 11.—SERVICE-LEVEL SAFETY ASSESSMENTa 
Service Continuity Integrity Availability (provision) Availability (use) 
D-OTIS Minor Hazardous Major Minor 
D-SIG Minor Hazardous Minor Minor 
D-RVR Minor Hazardous Major Minor 
WAKE Major Hazardous Minor Minor 
FLIPCY Major Hazardous Hazardous Major 
PPD No safety effect Minor No safety effect No safety effect 
D-SIGMET Minor Hazardous Minor Minor 
aAcronyms are defined in Appendix A. 
 
It should be noted that the COCR Version 2.0 document safety assessment focused on safety 
objectives and possible consequences of safety lapses and did not identify causes of potential safety 
hazards and/or performance degradation.  
 
Severity
No Safety 
Effect Low Medium High-Severe
High-
Catastrophic
Likelihood 5 4 3 2 1
Frequent A
Probable B
Remote C
Extremely 
Remote D
2
Extremely 
Improbable E 4
*
* Unacceptable with Single Point
and Common Cause Failure
High Risk
Medium Risk
Low Risk
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Appendix E.—Existing National Airspace System Communications 
System Safety Controls  
Existing National Airspace System (NAS) communications system safety controls provided in the 
NAS Communications System Safety Hazard Analysis and Security Threat Analysis document (Ref. 5) 
were reviewed. Most, but not all, of the controls were found applicable to the proposed C-band system. 
Additional controls were considered. The new AeroMACS shall comply with the performance and 
infrastructure requirements.  
Table 12 includes the required controls and identifies procedures, environment, requirements, etc. that 
reduce the probability of occurrence of the hazard, limit the severity, and/or reduce the likelihood of 
occurrence of the worst credible effect (WCE) and shall be implemented by program to meet the 
identified risk or risk assessment code (RAC) for each hazard. 
 
TABLE 12.—COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SAFETY CONTROLS 
Existing  
control ref. no.a 
Existing National Airspace System (NAS) controls Proposed controls 
1 The air-ground terminal communications (TCOM) and en route 
communications (ECOM) communication shall be in accordance with 
Communication Diversity Order 6000.36A. 
Existing control applies  
2 The NAS shall provide air-ground (A/G) communications capabilities 
on a continuous basis (NAS–SR–1000 3.6.1.E). 
The NAS shall provide A/G 
communications continuously (NAS SR–
1000, part of 20330). Control applies to 
air/air (A/A) and A/G communications. 
3 The A/G communication system shall comply with critical services 
performance requirements: Availability: 0.99999. No single point of 
failure of equipment, system, installation or facility shall cause loss of 
service to the user/specialist. The goal for a single loss of critical 
service to a user/specialist shall not exceed the duration of 6 seconds. 
The frequency of occurrence goal for any loss of service shall not 
exceed one per week (NAS SR–1000 Section 3.8.1 Operational 
Readiness, Table 3.6.1). 
The NAS shall provide service availability 
not less than that provided by existing 
capabilities. Critical Services: 0.99999 
Essential Services: 0.999 Routine Services: 
0.99 (NAS SR 1000, 21470) 
The NAS shall strive to restore critical 
system service to users/specialists within 
6 seconds of failure (NAS SR–1000, 
22900). 
The NAS shall strive to restore routine 
system service to users/specialists within 
1.68 hours of failure (NAS SR–1000, 
22920). 
The NAS shall strive to restore essential 
system service to users/specialists within 
10 minutes of failure (NAS SR–1000, 
22910). 
No single point of failure of equipment, 
system, installation or facility shall cause 
loss of service to the user/specialist. 
4 The NAS shall provide specialists with the capability to communicate 
with aircraft and vehicles in the airport movement area. Alternative 
forms of communication, such as visual signals transmitted by 
specialists, shall be provided in case normal A/G voice and data 
communications fail or are unavailable (NAS–SR–1000 3.2.11.F). 
Existing control applies. Reference not 
found in the new version of the  
NAS SR–1000. 
5 The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is 
the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft (FAA Order 
7110.65 91.3(a)). 
Existing control applies. 
6 Standard no com procedures: Lost communications procedures are 
prescribed. (Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) 4–2–13) and 
Standard pilot procedures two-way radio communication failure 
Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 91.113 
• Alternate control procedure (i.e., light gun instructions from towers) 
• See-and-avoid procedures are prescribed (AIM 5–5–8 and FAR 91.113). 
Existing control applies. 
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TABLE 12.—COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SAFETY CONTROLS 
Existing  
control ref. no.a 
Existing National Airspace System (NAS) controls Proposed controls 
7 Current separation standards (FAA order 7110.65) Existing control applies. 
8 Procedures for maintaining clearance limits (definitions of clearance 
limit are FAA Pilot/Controller Glossary also the ICAO definition, 
ATC Clearance limit procedures are prescribed (7110.65, 4-6-1a 
Clearance Limit and FAR 91.185)) 
• ICAO PANS–RAC 4444: paragraph 5.2.1.1 “No clearance shall be 
given to execute any maneuver that would reduce the spacing 
between two aircraft to less than the separation minimum.” 
Existing control applies. 
9 Aircraft under radar and/or visual surveillance (except ocean and 
some ground environments in IMC). (FAA Order 7110.65P Effective 
Data August 4, 2005 Chapter 5, Radar and Visual, p. 7-2-1.) 
Existing control applies. 
10 Aircraft-to-aircraft communications remains available (airborne or on-
ground). 
Existing control applies.  
11 ATC procedures to transfer communication functions (after 
communication failure) to other positions/sectors/facilities are 
prescribed (7110.65, 10-4-4). 
Existing control applies.  
12 Possible alternative communications capabilities (e.g., cell phone, 
public telephone, AOC, satellite phone when available relay 
(neighboring facility). Local SOP tailored to that facility and good 
operating procedures or FAA Order 7110.65P Effective Data 
August 4, 2005 Chapter 10 Emergencies section 1 General 10-1-1d. 
Existing control applies.  
13 TCAS is available for transport category aircraft (FAR 14CFR Part 
129.18). 
Existing control applies.  
14 Procedures requiring “pilot acknowledgement/read back” when ATC 
issues clearances or instructions (7110.65, 2-4-3). 
Existing control applies.  
15 Controllers can also determine aircraft action through surveillance; 
IDENT, observing radar screen (FAA Order 7110.65P Effective Data 
August 4, 2005 Chapter 5, Radar). 
Existing control applies.  
16 Controllers are required to order a clearance such that the critical 
information cannot be lost due to a failure truncating a message. 
Existing control applies.  
17 A/A communications still available, so another aircrew may hear a 
step on or incorrect read-back and notify, and/or aircraft can announce 
intentions on party line. 
Existing control applies.  
18 Procedures requiring aircraft identification for clearance (7110.65, 
2-4-20) 
• Call sign/runway ID (not shortened call sign) 
• Procedures for identification of the aircraft requesting clearances 
• Procedures for giving aircraft ID in granting clearances 
Existing control applies. 
19 Procedures requiring facility identification (7110.65, 2-4-8) for the 
ATC facility giving the clearances. 
Existing control applies.  
20 ICAO Annex 11: paragraph 3.5.1 “A controlled flight shall be under 
the control of only one air traffic control unit at any given time.” 
• The aircraft shall accept clearances/instructions only from the 
current control authority. 
Existing control applies.  
21 The intended recipient is also listening so he/she may query or chime 
in (party line). 
Existing control applies.  
22 Voice procedures 
• Procedures for giving aircraft ID in granting clearances 
• Procedures for communication when aircraft have same or similar 
call signs 
Existing control applies. Voice would 
provide backup communication. 
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TABLE 12.—COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SAFETY CONTROLS 
Existing  
control ref. no.a 
Existing National Airspace System (NAS) controls Proposed controls 
23 Voice and data communications shall have the following response 
capabilities: 
• Initiation of one-way A/G voice transmissions shall be possible 
within 250 milliseconds of keying the specialist’s microphone. 
• The G/A transmission time for data messages shall not exceed 
6 seconds (NAS–SR–1000 3.6.1.A.5). 
The NAS shall assure G/A transmission 
time for data messages not exceed 
6 seconds (NAS SR–1000, 20090). 
24 Time-critical clearance can be sent with constraint (e.g., to reach by, 
cross at or before etc.). Thus if message was too late then aircrew 
would have send an UNABLE response. FAA Order 7110.65P 
(Chapter 4, Section 3 Departure Procedures 4-3-4 a. Clearance Void 
Times). 
Existing control applies.  
25 ADS report (surveillance) can provide aircraft position (FAA Order 
7110.65P Effective Data August 4, 2005, Chapter 5 Radar). 
Existing control applies. 
26 CPDLC pilot position reports can provide aircraft position. Existing control applies.  
27 Oceanic separation standards (FAA Order 7110.65P Effective Data 
August 4, 2005 Chapter 8 Offshore/Oceanic Procedures). 
N/A 
28 Clearly intelligible A/G voice communications shall be provided 
(NAS-SR-1000 3.6.1.A). 
The NAS shall provide intelligible 
air-ground voice communications  
(NAS SR-1000, 20040). 
29 Procedures requiring Emphasis for Clarity (7110.65, 2-4-15). Existing control applies.  
30 Only one pre-departure clearance (PDC) is sent (thus cannot get out of 
order). 
Existing control applies.  
31 Airport design minimizes runway and taxiway crossing by vehicles. Existing control applies. 
32 Standard no com procedures. Covered by Control 6. 
33 Vehicle operation training/ licensing for airport operations Part 
139.329(e) requires that "each certificate holder shall -- ensure that 
each employee, tenant, or contractor who operates aground vehicle on 
any portion of the airport that has access to the movement area is 
familiar with the airport's procedures for the operation of ground 
vehicles and the consequences of noncompliance." To comply with 
Part 139.329(e), airport operators should have a ground vehicle 
guidebook for training personnel authorized to operate a ground 
vehicle on the airport. Part 139.301 Records – ground vehicle training; 
139.303 Personnel Sufficient Qualified Personnel (303a), Properly 
Equipped (303b), Trained (303c), Record of Training for 24 CCM 
(303d). 
Existing control applies. 
34 Vehicles all yield to aircraft: AC 150/5210-20 Ground Vehicle 
Operations on Airports - guidance to airport operators in developing 
training programs for safe ground vehicle operations, Sample Ground 
Vehicle Operations Training Manual Appendix B 1.7.10. No vehicle 
operator shall enter the movement area— 
a. Without first obtaining permission of the (AIRPORT 
OPERATOR) and clearance from the ATCT to enter the 
movement area; 
b. Unless equipped with an operable two-way radio in 
communication with the ATCT; or 
c. Unless escorted by an (AIRPORT OPERATOR) vehicle and as 
long as the vehicle remains under the control of the escort vehicle. 
Existing control applies. 
35 Vehicles under visual surveillance or radar/multi-lateration 
surveillance: FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control Handbook, 
paragraph 3-1-3, "Use of Active Runways," states, "The local 
controller has primary responsibility for operations conducted on the 
active runway and must control the use of those runways." Paragraph 
3-1-12, "Visually Scanning Runways," states that, "Local controllers 
shall visually scan runways to the maximum extent possible." 
Existing control applies. 
36 Mobile-to-mobile communications still available Existing control applies. 
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TABLE 12.—COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SAFETY CONTROLS 
Existing  
control ref. no.a 
Existing National Airspace System (NAS) controls Proposed controls 
37 The NAS shall provide specialists with the capability to communicate 
with aircraft and vehicles in the airport movement area. Alternative 
forms of communication, such as visual signals transmitted by 
specialists, shall be provided in case normal A/G voice and data 
communications fail or are unavailable (NAS–SR–1000 3.2.11.F). 
Covered by Control 4. 
38 Possible alternative communications capabilities e.g., cell phone, 
ATCT light gun procedures. 
Covered by Control 12. 
39 Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 139 (14 CFR Part 
139] requirement to familiarize vehicles for operating on a given airport. 
Existing control applies. 
40 FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control Handbook, paragraph 3-1-3, 
Use of Active Runways, The local controller has primary 
responsibility for operations conducted on the active runway and must 
control the use of those runways. 
Existing control applies. 
41 AC 150/5340-18D Standards for Airport Sign Systems Part 139.311 
CFR MARKING, SIGNS AND LIGHTING AC 150/5210-22 Airport 
Certification Manual (ACM): Paragraph 302(a) “Airport sign and 
marking plans must receive FAA approval before they are 
implemented” Chapter 5. Section 139.311 “Include in the ACM a 
legible color diagram of the airport sign and marking systems.” 
Existing control applies. 
42 FAA Order 7110.65 Paragraph 3-1-12, Visually Scanning Runways - 
Local controllers shall visually scan runways to the maximum extent 
possible. 
Existing control applies. 
43 CFR Part 139.329(b) airport operators are required to establish and 
implement procedures for operation of ground vehicles in the safety 
area as well as the movement area. 
Existing control applies. 
44 CFR Part 139.205(b)(19) requires that these procedures be included in 
the Airport Certification Manual (ACM). 
Existing control applies. 
45 Controller use of full call sign/runway ID (not shortened) (FAA Order 
7110.65P 3-7-1 Ground Traffic Movement Phraseology). 
Existing control applies. 
46 Controllers must establish position before moving vehicle (FAA 
Order 7110.65 Section 1 General 3-1-7 Position Determination). 
Existing control applies. 
47 Procedures for identification of vehicles requesting clearances (Part 
139CFR ground vehicle guidebook for training). 
Existing control applies. 
48 Controller procedures for giving vehicle ID in granting clearances 
(FAA Order 7110.65 Section 7 Taxi and Ground Movement 
Procedures 3-7-2 Taxi and Ground Movement Operations). 
Existing control applies. 
49 Vehicle readback procedures (voice) (Part 139CFR ground vehicle 
guidebook for training). 
Existing control applies. 
50 Intrafacility communication requirements have been minimized due to 
automation of many functions. 
N/A 
51 Controller/assistant/supervisor can walk over and talk to other 
controller. 
N/A 
52 Voice messages would not get a proper acknowledgement, when 
truncated due to a failure (Procedure between interphone 
intra/interfacility communication that utilize numeric position 
identification, the caller must identify both position and facility (FAA 
Order 7110.65P 2-4-12 Interphone Message Format) e. The receiver 
states the response to the caller's message followed by the receiver's 
operating initials. f. The caller states his or her operating initials). 
N/A 
53 SR-1000: 3.6.2A 1: The NAS shall provide direct-access voice 
communications connectivity between specialist in on ATC facility 
and designated specialist in another facility as shown in Table 3-1. 
The number of direct-access calls that are blocked because of 
saturation of equipment shall not exceed 1 in 1000 calls. 
N/A 
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TABLE 12.—COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SAFETY CONTROLS 
Existing  
control ref. no.a 
Existing National Airspace System (NAS) controls Proposed controls 
54 Other facility can be reached by other means (Local Contingency 
Plan—FAA Order 7210.3 Facility 2-1-7 Air Traffic Service (ATS) 
Continuity a. Facilities shall develop and maintain current operational 
plans and procedures to provide continuity of required services during 
emergency conditions (e.g., power failures, fire, flood ) b. 
Contingency plans). · Relay through aircraft · Cell phones · Public 
phone system (FAA Order 7210.3 Section 3, 3-3-1. SERVICE "F" 
COMMUNICATIONS Facility AT managers shall establish 
procedures to provide interim communications in the event that local 
or long-line standard Service "F" fail. These shall include the use of 
telephone conference circuits and the use of airline or other facilities; 
3-3-2. TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS). 
N/A 
55 Facilities periodically check availability of communications with other 
facilities and would be aware of loss of communications. 
N/A 
56 Procedures exist to transfer control to another facility in case of 
failure. (e.g., primarily redundancy: ARTCC to ARTCC and ARTCC 
to Command Center rely through third party) FAA Order 7210.3 
Facility Operation and Administration; Section 3. Letters of 
Agreement (LOA) 4-3-1. LETTERS OF AGREEMENT; 4-3-2. 
APPROPRIATE SUBJECTS Examples of subjects of LOAs are: a. 
Between ARTCCs: 1. Radar handoff procedures.2. Interfacility 
coordination procedures.3. Delegation of responsibility for IFR 
control jurisdiction. 
N/A 
57 Procedures exist to have aircraft initiate transfer with receiving facility 
(FAA Order 7110.65P 8-2-2 Transfer of Control and 
Communications). 
N/A 
58 Automation and visual alerts to detect 
• Aircraft positions 
• Out-of-conformance 
• Potential conflicts 
N/A 
59 7110: IFR operations in any class of controlled airspace, a pilot must 
receive an appropriate ATC clearance prior to entering in the airspace. 
N/A 
60 Interfacility data communications shall be provided with error 
detection and correction capabilities (NASSRS 3.6.3.A.11) NAS 
systems digital circuits basic requirement to provide in excess of 
99.9% error-free seconds. 
N/A 
61 NAS–SR–1000 p3.6.2.A.3 Ground-Ground Interfacility 
Communications Connectivity 5) Clearly intelligible interfacility 
voice communications shall be provided. 
N/A 
62 FTI Attachment J.1, FAA Telecommunications Services Description 
(FTSD): Voice Quality Mean Opinion Score (MOS) equal to or 
greater than 4.3. 
N/A 
63 ATC uses judgment whether or not to clear aircraft to land (FAA 
Order 7110.65P 3-1-5. Vehicles/equipment/ personnel on runways). 
N/A 
64 The NAS shall provide the specialist with an unobstructed view of the 
airport movement area (NAS–SR–1000 3.2.11.D). 
N/A 
65 The NAS shall be capable of continuously broadcasting the latest 
approved aerodrome and terminal area conditions on communications 
media that can be accessed by aircraft in flight and on the ground 
(NAS–SR–1000 3.3.3.B). 
N/A 
66 Aeronautical information shall be continuously (24 hours a day) 
accessible to specialists (NAS–SR–1000 3.1.2.B). 
N/A 
67 Aeronautical information shall be continuously (24 hours a day) 
accessible to users upon request with or without the aid of specialists 
(NAS–SR–1000 3.1.2.C). 
N/A 
68 Aeronautical information shall be obtainable along a specified route, 
or in conjunction with specified locations or areas, or by reporting 
location. (NAS–SR–1000 3.1.2.D). 
N/A 
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TABLE 12.—COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SAFETY CONTROLS 
Existing  
control ref. no.a 
Existing National Airspace System (NAS) controls Proposed controls 
69 Real-time required communication between FIRs has been minimized; 
most transfers can be done sufficiently in advance. (FAA Order 
7110.65P Section 8-2-1 Coordination) 
N/A 
70 Foreign ATC can be reached by other means  
• Relay through aircraft 
• Cell phones 
• Public phone system 
N/A 
71 In a two-way exchange; usually getting cut-off etc. would be detected 
by one or both parties and coordination would be attempted again; it 
would be rare for the failure to go undetected. 
N/A 
72 Boundary coordination times are agreed by memorandum of 
understanding between FIRs (FAA Order 7110.65P 8-2-2). 
N/A 
73 Receiving ground system has flight plan  
(FAA Order 7110.65P 8-2-1 a). 
N/A 
74 Receiving ground system would initiate coordination/transfer (FAA 
Order 7110.65P 8-2-2). 
N/A 
75 ICAO format boundary coordination messages are tagged and time 
stamped. 
N/A 
76 AOC-ATC messages cannot affect separation. N/A 
77 Aircraft have highly reliable systems (AC-25-11 viii, Loss of all 
communication functions must be improbable; RTCA/DO-254 Design 
Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware; AC 25.1309-
1A (Air Transport ) SYSTEM DESIGN AND ANALYSIS; AC 
23.1309-1C (General Aviation) EQUIPMENT, SYSTEMS, AND 
INSTALLATIONS IN PART 23 AIRPLANES;FAA FAR 121 
requirement of “two means of communication for the intended 
operating environment”). 
Existing control applies.  
78 Standard operating procedures/pilot training. Existing control applies.  
79 Redundancy to prevent interruption, centers can talk to multiple 
facilities (2 or 3 facilities typical) and command center. 
N/A 
80 Diverse entry points into facilities (Communication Diversity Order 
6000.36 A). 
N/A 
81 Procedure to switch to emergency operational AT procedures. (FAA 
Order 7210.3 Facility Operation and Administration Section 3 letters 
of agreement (LOAs) 4-3-1 Letters of Agreement; g. Establish 
responsibilities for: 2. Providing emergency services). 
N/A 
82 Procedure to switch to FAA-owned communications systems— 
FAATSAT transportable equip., RCL, portable A/G radio. 
N/A 
83 IDAT parity and checksum to reliably detect corruption of the message. N/A 
84 ATC able to transmit command clearances and receive pilot feedback 
via equipment other than com radio (e.g., transponder, navigation 
radio) (FAA Order 7110.65, 10-4-4, 3-2-1, FARs 91.215, 91.205) 
Existing control applies.  
85 Data link messages are time stamped so order can be determined. Existing control applies.  
86 Data link response message indicate to which message they refer. Existing control applies. 
89  The NAS shall comply with national 
standards to avoid the interference of new 
systems with existing systems (NAS 
SR-1000, 19310). 
90  C-band system shall comply with the 
performance and infrastructure requirements. 
aControl numbers 1 to 83 correspond to the Existing Controls, Table 2-3 of Ref. 5. Controls 84 to 86 are noted in the above document but 
not listed in Table 2-3. Controls beyond 86 are additional controls suggested for the proposed L-DACS 
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